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RECENT CASE NOTES
The majority view has been that where a statute requires a person or
firm to procure a broker's license, a contract made by a person in such a
business without the procuring of a license is void and no recovery can be
had thereon.1 6 This majority view that a contract is void when the requirements of the statute requiring the license is not met has been followed in Indiana. Indeed, it has been so extended that the contract has
been declared void; even though the statute does not specifically so state,
but places some regulation upon entering or engaging in the business.17
In these cases the complaint was insufficient unless the plaintiff had alleged
the performance of all the requirements of the statute. Thus, it may be
said that in Indiana, where a business, profession or acts have been made
the subject of legislation and penalties have been fixed for failure to comply with the statute, the one who asserts a right based on such business,
profession, or act must affirmatively allege compliance with the statute as
a condition precedent to his right.
C. A. R.
TAxATIoN-INHunrrANcE TAX-INTANGIBLE

PROPERTY-DUE PROCESS OF

LAW-Included in the estate of deceased, a subject of Great Britain, and
resident of Cuba, not engaged in business in the United States, were bonds
and certificates of stock of foreign governments and corporations, bonds of
domestic corporations and a domestic municipality, and a deposit with a
domestic banking concern. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue included
these in the gross estate of deceased subject to Federal estate tax under
the Revenue Act of 1924. The Board of Tax Appeals decided the Act did
not apply to such intangibles,' and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision. 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held, first, that
the Act was intended to include such property, and second, that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment did not make the tax invalid be3
cause of lack of jurisdiction; judgment of lower courts reversed.
Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court decided in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota4 that
negotiable bonds and certificates of indebtedness issued by State or municipal governments, some registered, and others negotiable, are rightly regarded as if ordinary choses in action, and a death duty can be placed on
them only by the State of the domicile of the owner. Baldwin v. Missouri5
extended this rule to include bank deposits, Federal coupon bonds and
promissory notes; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission6 extended
24Hirk v.Rich (1910), 156 111..App. 483; Sprager v. Reilly (1907), 34 Pa.
Super.
Ct. 332; Pile v.Carpenter (1907), 118 Tenn. 288, 99 S. W. 360.
1t
Becker v. Perw Trust Co. (1912), Ind. App. 184, 97 N. D. 23; Sandage v.
Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. (1895), 142 Ind. 148, 41 X. E. 380; Horning v.McGill
(1919), 188 Ind. 332, 116 N. E. 303; Wells v.Indianapolis Co. (1928), 88 Ind. App.
231, 161 N. D. 687.
122 3.T. A. 71.
260 Fed. (2nd) 690.
3Burnet, Commis. of Internal Revenue, v. Brooks, March 13, 1933, 53 Sp. Ct.
457.
'280 U. S. 204, 50 Sp. Ct 98 (1930).
5 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sp. Ct. 436 (1930).
'282 U. S. 1, 51 Sp. Ct. 54 (1931).
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it to open accounts; and First National Bank of Boston v. Maine7 to corporate stock. Thus, it is safe to say that today under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has decided that State is
without jurisdiction to place a tax on the transfer of intangible property
by death unless the deceased owner was domiciled there.
It is thus obvious that the rule as to jurisdiction to tax intangibles under
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the Federal
Government is the exact opposite of the rule as applied to the States under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, however,
in its fully reasoned opinion, recognizes this inconsistency, but justifies it
on the ground that it is the necessary consequence of the difference between
the natures of the sovereignties of the State and Federal Governments. As
to the argument that because the rule established in the principal case is different from the one applied to the States it ought not to be upheld, the
opinion states: "The argument is specious, but it ignores an established
distinction. Due process requires that the limits of jurisdiction shall not be
transgressed. That requirement leaves the limits of jurisdiction to be ascertained in each case with appropriate regard to the distinct spheres of
activity of state and nation. The limits of state power are defined in view
of the relation of the states to each other in the Federal Union. The bond
of the Constitution qualifies their jurisdiction." But, "the criterion of state
taxing power by virtue of the relation of the states to each other under the
Constitution is not a criterion of the taxing power of the United States
by virtue of its sovereignty in relation to the property of non-residents. The
Constitution is not the criterion of the taxing power of the United States
and foreign countries as it creates between the states themselves."
The same idea was expressed by the Court as long ago as 1914, when,
in the case of United States v. Bennett,8 it said: "The application to the
States of the rule of due process relied upon comes from the fact that their
spheres of activity are enforced and protected by the Constitution, and it is
therefore impossible for one State to reach out and tax property in another
without violating the Constitution, for where the power of one ends the
authority of the other begins. But this has no application to the Government of the United States so far as its admitted taxing power is concerned.
It is coextensive with the limits of the United States; it knows no restriction except where one is expressed in or arises from the Constitution and
therefore embraces all the attributes which appertain to sovereignty in the
fullest sense. Indeed the existence of such a wide power is the essential
resultant of the limitation restricting the States within their allotted
spheres, for if it were not so then government in the plenary and usual
acceptation of that word would have no existence. Because the limitations
of the Constitution are barriers bordering the States and preventing them
from transcending the limits of their authority and thus destroying the
rights of other States and at the same time saving their rights from destruction by the other States, in other words of maintaining and preserving the rights of all the States, affords no ground for constructing an
7284 U. S. 312, 52 Sp. Ct. 174 (1932). See also 7 Ind. L. T. 495 (1932) ; and
30 Col. L. Rev. 405.
8 232 U. S. 299, 34 Sp. Ct. 433; see also Cook . Tait, 265 U. S. 47, 44 Sp. Ct.
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imaginary constitutional barrier around the exterior confines of the United
States for the purpose of shutting that government off from the exertion
of powers which inherently belong to it by virtue of its sovereignty." This
same language was quoted by Chief Justice Hughes in his opinion in the
principal ease as supporting the decision.
It is clear, then, that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as to jurisdiction of the States to tax intangibles means one thing,
and that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment has an altogether
different meaning when applied to the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. As to the latter, due process as to substance apparently has no
meaning, but is a restraint on the Federal Government's power only as to
matters of procedure.
But is this inconsistency in fact justified? In Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota,9 the Court said: "Primitive conditions have passed; business is now transacted on a national scale. A very large part of the country's wealth is invested in negotiable securities whose protection against
discrimination, unjust and oppressive taxation, is matter of the greatest
moment." Do not these same arguments apply with nearly equal force
today in international commerce? The Court notes the fact that "jurisdiction (to tax) may exist in more than one government, that is, jurisdiction
based on distinct grounds," and cites Winams v. Attorney-General,o an
English case, to show that England has upheld the same tax on the same
ground-that there is no international limitation preventing-and further
states that the nations at present recognize the fact that double or multiple
taxation raises a problem, and are working together in an effort to find a
solution for it.
There is an even more important question to consider. What effect will
the case have on American business? Is it not obvious that many subjects
and residents of other countries who, in the past, have kept property of the
nature involved here in this country, allowing the income to be collected
and deposited in American banks, will, in the future, take this property
out of the country for the purpose of avoiding the tax? Regarding the matter from a business standpoint alone, is it not probable that the government
would eventually profit most by allowing what money it could collect from
such estates as death duties to be lost, and keep such property in the
country?
W. T. H.
TRUSTS--INSOLVENT BANxS--TRACING TRUST PRoPE&TY-April 18, 1930,
the City Trust Company, as executor of the will of James Fordice French.
paid over to itself as trustee under a trust created by the same will, the
sum )f $90,000 in cash. This money was commingled with all other money
in the hands of the Company and turned over to the banking department
as cash. All but $38,679.68 was invested by the Company for the benefit of
the trust. October 23, 1930, the City Trust Company went into hands of a
receiver with cash on hand amounting to $18,255.76. The cash on hand was
never less than that amount after the trust fund was deposited. Claimant
is the duly appointed present trustee of the French trust and claims a pre'Note 4, supra.
10(1910)

A. C. 27.

